Teaching for Toleration in Pluralist Liberal Democracies by van Waarden, Betto
democracy & education, vol 25, no- 1  Feature article 1
Teaching for Toleration in  
Pluralist Liberal Democracies
Betto van Waarden (KU Leuven)
Abstract
This article determines which education enables the perpetuation of diverse ways of life and the liberal 
democracy that accommodates this diversity. Liberals like John Rawls, Stephen Macedo, and William 
Galston have disagreed about the scope of civic education. Based on an analysis of toleration— the primary 
means for maintaining a pluralist liberal democracy— I argue that schools should teach democratic partici-
patory skills and a minimal exposure to diversity to enable citizens to participate in the democratic process 
of defining which cultural and religious practices the state should tolerate or prohibit through its laws. To 
make this argument, I contend, in contrast to several scholars, that toleration is practiced primarily 
between the democratic state and citizens rather than among citizens. Although many theorists do not 
show the educational implications of their theories, I conclude that schools must teach: (a) mutual respect 
among citizens, (b) citizens’ constitutional rights, (c) democratic participatory skills, (d) a basic under-
standing of other worldviews, and (e) critical media skills. Students should master these components 
through instruction on government, cultures and religions, and the media, but more important through 
discussions and democratic simulations both inside and outside the classroom.
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This article aims to determine which kind of education enables the perpetuation of a reasonable diversity of ways of life and a form of liberal democ-
racy that accommodates this diversity. If there is insufficient civic 
education, citizens may lose the ability to coexist peacefully. 
However, if civic education is too extensive, it may forcefully 
liberalize and destroy reasonable life modes1— including their 
cultural values and morality that some argue liberal democracy 
depends on (see Galston, 1991, p. 9; Walzer, 1994, pp. 4– 21).
1 Reasonable life mode is based on Rawls’s concept of “reasonable 
comprehensive doctrine” (2005, p. 59). However, I prefer reasonable life 
mode, as it encompasses not only doctrines, religions, and cultures but 
also their related practices, which can cause division and the need for 
(legal) accommodation of diversity.
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The question of accommodating diversity implies that 
education will be based on political liberalism and its emphasis on 
shared political principles among (conflicting) groups. It precludes 
a comprehensive liberal education focused on individuality or 
autonomy, which many liberals advocate (e.g., Callan, 1997; 
Gutmann, 1995; Levinson, 1999) but which threatens and is 
therefore unacceptable to certain cultural groups. However, 
political liberals have responded to this question of schooling 
differently. Most agree that schools should teach an understanding 
of liberal institutions but disagree about the degree to which 
cultural, philosophical, and religious studies, as well as critical 
thinking skills, should be taught. There are three main positions  
in this debate:2
The moderate view is represented by Rawls. In Rawls’s brief 
treatment of education, he has indicated that children should not 
be taught comprehensive doctrines including liberal autonomy 
or individuality but “that children’s education include such things 
as knowledge of their constitutional and civic rights,” “prepare 
them to be fully cooperating members of society and enable them 
to be self- supporting,” and “encourage the political virtues so that 
they want to honor the fair terms of social cooperation in their 
relations with the rest of society” (2005, pp. 199– 200). Rawls has 
not really addressed schooling but seems to make civic virtues 
dependent on the educative function of liberal institutions  
(2005, pp. 142, 163). However, Costa (2004, p. 9) and Callan (1997,  
pp. 26– 39) infer from Rawls’s political liberalism that schooling 
should include exposure to different life modes so that children 
can learn to reciprocate civically.
The activist view is explained by Macedo. Macedo has 
stressed that citizens’ freedom of religion does not extend to 
indoctrinating their children and that the state has a legitimate 
interest in schools teaching a diversity of worldviews so that 
children become tolerant (1995; 2000, pp. 12, 167). In contrast 
to Rawls, Macedo argued that state education should aim to 
transform children’s beliefs for civic purposes. “The success  
of the negative constitutional project of individual liberty 
depends on a more positive, transformative enterprise that 
aims to shape normative diversity in a basic way, to foster a 
civic life supportive of liberal citizenship,” and “individual 
freedom, the rule of law, and constitutionally limited govern-
ment depend upon profound transformations in systems of 
belief and culture” (Macedo, 2000, pp. 10, 276, also 3, 8). For 
these transformations, Macedo relied on a Millian approach to 
civic education through institutions, like Rawls has done, but 
has made it more expansive (2000, pp. 169, also 6, 276). Despite 
his minimal intentions, Macedo’s political liberalism is 
far- reaching:
For a liberal democracy to thrive and not only survive, many of its 
citizens should develop a shared commitment to a range of political 
values and virtues: tolerance, mutual respect, and active 
2 I use Rawls, Macedo, and Galston to illustrate the three positions be-
cause they are the most cited scholars in the citizenship education debate 
(Fernández & Sundström, 2011).
cooperation among fellow citizens of various races, creeds, and styles 
of life [emphasis added].3 (2000, pp. 10– 11; also 1995, p. 487)
The minimalist view is endorsed by Galston. Although 
Galston shares fundamental views with Rawls and Macedo, he 
wants schools to teach only toleration and a basic understanding 
of liberal institutions. He has left the rest up to cultural groups to 
truly accommodate diversity (1991, p. 256; 1995, pp. 525– 528; 2003; 
2005, p. 4; 2006, pp. 329, 334). He has argued that the “reasonable” 
pluralism of Macedo and Rawls, rather than “simple” pluralism, 
excludes too many life modes that are still compatible with liberal 
democracy, and that such exclusion causes homogenization and 
suppression that hurt liberal democratic stability (Galston, 1991,  
p. 119; 1995, pp. 518– 519; 2006, p. 334).4 Galston’s solution to 
peaceful coexistence is preventing the state from interfering 
unnecessarily with life modes. He has admitted that the best civic 
education might be more demanding than what he proposes but 
argued, in contrast to Macedo, that the state does not have the 
authority to mandate such education (1995, pp. 528– 529; 2002; 
2006, p. 333). More than Rawls and Macedo, he fears that teaching 
children to think autonomously threatens groups with religious or 
nonliberal life modes and thus wants to keep such teaching to a 
civic minimum (1995, p. 521; see also Kukathas, 1997; Parekh, 
2000, pp. 109– 111). He has rejected the argument that toleration 
demands autonomy to reflect on other life modes, by indicating 
that citizens merely need to learn to refrain from using state power 
to advance their life modes over others’. He has conceded that 
citizens need a minimal awareness of other life modes for tolera-
tion but concluded that this does not require schools to teach 
children to be critical of their own way of life (1995, pp. 524– 529).
Despite the different positions on education of these three, 
Rawls (2005, pp. 59, 194– 195) has indicated that toleration is an 
important component of political liberalism on which education 
should be based, and Macedo and Galston, along with other scholars 
(e.g., Shorten, 2010; Weinstock, 2004, p. 114), all have argued that 
schools should teach toleration. However, none of them has 
considered the meaning of toleration and the schooling it requires. 
Toleration is arguably the primary means to perpetuating liberal 
democracy and allowing for a diversity of (conflicting) life modes. 
Here I draw out a neglected but important aspect of the education 
debate by analyzing the demands that toleration places on schooling.
My argument is that schools must teach students the 
democratic participatory skills needed to define liberal democ-
racy’s limits of toleration. I make this argument by showing the 
limited role of toleration in relations among citizens and offering 
a theory about how, through the democratic process, citizens 
help to determine the state laws that regulate society’s limits of 
toleration.
3 For commentary on Macedo and his “totalist” approach to political 
liberalism, see Fernández & Sundström, 2011, p. 375; Galston, 2002; Gut-
mann, 1995; Mulhall, 1998. For other comparisons of Rawls and Macedo 
on education, see also Costa, 2004, pp. 1– 2; Vaughan, 2005, pp. 394– 395.
4 For a discussion about Galston and his defense of diversity, see Cal-
lan, 2004, p. 77; Fullinwider, 2004; Vaughan, 2005, pp. 398– 399.
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Toleration
To tolerate means to disagree with a belief or practice but neverthe-
less to refrain from rejecting it. Rejecting a practice thus goes 
beyond disagreement or disapproval. Rejection means to prevent 
or eliminate the practice. Normally, we accept what we agree with 
and reject what we disagree with, but in toleration we do not reject 
that with which we disagree. For example, in the Netherlands, 
many non- Muslims disagree with the “radical” Islamic ideas of 
Salafist organizations but refrain from converting, harming, or 
persecuting these organizations (see NRC, 2016c). This disagree-
ment defines toleration. If the non- Muslims were indifferent to, or 
even appreciative of, the orthodox Muslims’ beliefs and practices, it 
would not be toleration. Another example is a Copenhagen public 
school that organized women- only parents’ meetings to accommo-
date immigrant mothers whose culture would otherwise prevent 
them from attending. Many Danes disagreed with this initiative 
but tolerated it because they believed schools should be allowed to 
make autonomous decisions and it promoted school communica-
tion with parents who would otherwise be excluded (Maussen & 
Bader, 2012, p. 60). Two further observations about toleration are 
crucial to education:
The first observation is that the limits of toleration are not 
obvious and require knowledge of life modes and critical thinking 
to be defined. Defining the limits is complicated, as toleration has 
two boundaries rather than one. The first arises from the fact that 
we cannot accept everything. For instance, in 2013, many Austra-
lians did not accept the anti- Islam ideas of the Dutch populist 
Geert Wilders. However, they still chose to “tolerate” these ideas by 
allowing Wilders to give a speech in Australia (Soutphommasane, 
2013). Thus, there is a boundary between acceptance and tolera-
tion. The second boundary arises from the fact that we cannot 
tolerate everything that we do not accept: certain beliefs, or the 
practices that result from them, are simply wrong. As we have no 
moral or pragmatic reason to tolerate them nevertheless, we reject 
them. For example, Turkey tolerated the Islamic beliefs of many of 
its citizens but banned the Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) in 1997, 
arguing that this political party’s objectives of introducing theoc-
racy and sharia law threatened the country’s principle of secular-
ism and democracy (ECHR, 2003). Thus, by determining what is 
tolerable, we simultaneously determine what should be rejected 
(see also Barry, 2001, pp. 127– 144; Macedo, 1995, p. 485; Parekh, 
1999, p. 163; Tamir, 2003, p. 508).
The second observation is that the relations of toleration 
determine what citizens should be taught in schools. Three ideas 
are key. First, a prerequisite of any relation of toleration is that 
the tolerator must have the power to reject the life mode of the 
tolerated. Consequently, “toleration can take the form of (a) not 
making people do things they are unwilling to do, as well as  
(b) not preventing their doing what they wish to do” (Jones, 
2010, p. 43, also 40; also Horton, 2011, p. 290; Lægaard, 2010,  
p. 23). For example, the state is tolerant when it does not force 
Protestant children to attend secular state schools or does not 
prevent these children from attending Christian schools. 
Toleration is consciously refraining from the action of rejecting 
a belief or practice despite disapproving of it and having the 
power to prevent or stop it. Second, this prerequisite of power 
explains why toleration was traditionally a vertical relation in 
which a dominant group extended toleration to its subordinates 
(Forst, 2004, pp. 316– 317; Heyd, 2008, pp. 171– 194). For example, 
in previous centuries, monarchs in Europe determined which 
belief systems they tolerated within their territories. However, 
Heyd (2008, pp. 171– 194) and Creppell (2008, pp. 315– 359) have 
argued that this relation is largely replaced by one in which 
citizens tolerate each other reciprocally on a horizontal level. 
Jones added that “personal” toleration among citizens is more 
prevalent than “political” toleration among institutions and 
citizens (2010, p. 45). Similarly, Gutmann and Thompson have 
argued that “procedural principles (such as majority rule) 
regulate public policy disputes, and interpersonal principles of 
minimal moral content (such as toleration) take care of disputes 
outside the public forum” (1990, p. 65). These scholars thus have 
suggested that the vertical relation of toleration plays a minor 
role in contemporary liberal democracy— if any. Third, this idea 
of a horizontal relation coincides with the argument that 
toleration must be reciprocal (Creppell, 2008, pp. 315– 359; Forst, 
2004, p. 317; Habermas, 2003, pp. 5, 7). For example, Forst stated 
that “toleration can only be called for towards those who are 
tolerant; it is a matter of simple reciprocity” (2004, p. 313).
Respect for Public Identities and  
Citizens’ Lack of Power to Reject Practices
The ideas that determining the limits of toleration is complex and 
that toleration in contemporary liberal democracy is primarily 
horizontal and reciprocal among citizens suggest that citizens must 
make complex evaluations of toleration in their daily interactions. 
For example, when a Catholic student encounters a Muslim fellow 
student wearing a niqab on the school bus or sees a gay couple 
holding hands at her high school, she has to judge whether to 
tolerate the practices of wearing a veil or displaying homosexuality. 
To make such judgments, she needs knowledge about other life 
modes and the deliberative skills to evaluate these appropriately, or 
so the argument would go. However, I contend that schools should 
teach this cultural knowledge and reasoning for toleration, but that 
the reason is different. The relation among citizens requires little 
toleration. Rather, citizens must gain the capacity to make judg-
ments of toleration for their participation in the democratic 
political process.
Liberalism attempts to accommodate diversity by encourag-
ing citizens to separate their private and public identities. Their 
different (mutually exclusive) life modes do not conflict directly, 
but their public interaction is guided by a shared political identity 
(see Habermas, 2003, p. 12; Macedo, 2000, p. 164- 187; Mendus, 
1988, pp. 4– 10; Vaughan, 2005, p. 402). Critics may object that it is 
difficult in practice to distinguish between citizens’ public and 
private sides (see Forst, 2004, p. 319; Horton, 2011, p. 299; Vaughan, 
2005, p. 402). For example, an employee of the Dutch National 
Bank was fired in 2015 because she rented herself out as an S and M 
mistress in her private time and was therefore said to be liable to 
blackmail (Standaard, 2015). Thus, the bank punished the woman 
for having allowed the possibility that her private side might affect 
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her public side. This is a valid objection, and indeed, separating 
public and private identities is difficult. However, despite this 
difficulty, we should not give up trying to foster mutual respect 
among citizens at least within their public identity. The objection 
should serve as an additional reason for schools to teach students 
the merits of minimal civil respect for others.
Once we separate public and private identities, we assign a 
basic respect to the public side of citizens (see also Dent, 1988,  
pp. 115– 136; Lægaard, 2010, p. 29). Religious people must try to 
limit the influence of their beliefs on their interactions with other 
citizens and respect others based on their shared citizenship. 
Macedo (1995, p. 487) stressed that “evangelical atheists” and “those 
who espouse totalistic versions of liberalism” must do the same and 
respect religious people publicly as citizens. Such respect differs 
from toleration, in that it is unconditional and does not require an 
evaluation of the other’s life mode (see Habermas, 1994, p. 129). For 
example, in a deeply divided liberal democracy like Israel, students 
can only interact peacefully so long as they put aside their conflict-
ing Jewish, Christian, and Islamic beliefs and show a basic respect 
for each other in the public school based on their common Israeli 
citizenship.
This preclusion of the need for an evaluation of life modes also 
means that respect is neutral rather than positive. Such neutral 
respect contrasts with the “appraisal respect” (Darwall, 1977, pp. 
39– 49) or “mutual respect” (Gutmann & Thompson, 1990,  
pp. 76– 79) that some argue for, in which citizens evaluate each 
other’s moral worth and reach mutual appreciation, and which, 
therefore, is supposed to be more demanding than toleration 
(Gutmann & Thompson, 1990, p. 76; also Reich, 2002, p. 136). They 
contrast this appraisal respect with “recognition respect,” which all 
citizens are accorded without any (positive) evaluation of their life 
modes (Darwall, 1977, pp. 39– 49). However, this unrealistic 
expectation of appreciation is based on the unwarranted assumption 
that civic life is about groups coming together morally rather than 
negotiating politically. Gutmann and Thompson have argued that 
mutual respect is necessary for “resolving disputes” “on a moral 
basis” rather than “count[ing] on procedural agreements, political 
deals,” and that “the underlying assumption is that we should value 
reaching conclusions . . . through moral reasoning rather than 
through self- interested bargaining” (1990, p. 77). The ideals of 
moral reconciliation and mutual appreciation are praiseworthy but 
unrealistic in a society divided among conflicting groups. We 
cannot expect citizens to regard positively those they fundamen-
tally disagree with, but we do need to find a way for them to live 
together. That is why we need a liberal democracy in the first place: 
liberal rights protect citizens and accord them political equality, 
and the democratic process allows them to deliberate their 
differences peacefully. Even though it is unfortunate that civic life 
is conducted through “self- interested bargaining” rather than 
“moral reasoning,” it is precisely these “procedural agreements” 
and “political deals” that enable peaceful coexistence.
Besides, Darwall, Gutmann, and Thompson do not take 
seriously enough the implication of appraisal respect that, if a 
citizen does not merit appreciation following evaluation, she will 
not receive respect. Such lack of respect would put her in danger of 
unequal treatment, which is again why the liberal state enforces 
recognition respect among all citizens. For example, when male 
members of the Christian political party SGP in the Netherlands 
“evaluated” their female coreligionists, they did not reach an equal 
“appreciation” for them and, therefore, prevented them from 
standing for election. Consequently, in 2010, the High Council  
of the Dutch liberal democratic state had to intervene to mandate 
that the party allow females to be eligible for election (NJCM, 
2010), guaranteeing that citizens in their public interactions would 
continue to respect each other unconditionally as political equals 
(recognition respect).
Finally, we can define the difference between unconditional 
respect and conditional appreciation or rejection in terms of status. 
Status involves no value judgment but is assigned to every citizen.
Respect, as used in “respect for persons,” invokes an idea of status 
rather than merit. Thus, we may think that a person’s beliefs and form 
of life are without merit, but our respect for her status as a person can 
provide a reason why we should tolerate her beliefs and form of life in 
spite of our negative appraisal of them and even though our negative 
appraisal is soundly based. (Jones, 2010, p. 45)
The school environment is illustrative: children are all accorded the 
status of “student” and subsequently expected to treat each other 
equally without judging the worth of each other’s academic 
performances or opinions. The notion of status matches the liberal 
idea of respecting individuals as autonomous agents who can make 
decisions about their life modes privately (see Raz, 1988, pp. 
155- 170; Reich on “capacity” for autonomy, 2002, pp. 89– 112). 
Because we respect each other’s status as fellow citizens, we can 
make private decisions about our life modes in our capacity as 
respected citizens.
Even when a citizen evaluates others’ practices, she still has 
little power to reject them. In a liberal democracy, the state has a 
monopoly on the means to punish intolerable practices. Therefore, 
toleration is even less significant in the relation among citizens. 
Here it is surprising that Jones argued that toleration primarily 
occurs among citizens, given that he himself has stated that 
toleration requires power to reject disapproved practices (2010,  
p. 43– 45). Of course, this distinction between a powerful state and 
powerless citizens is not sharp. Citizens have certain power over 
others, such as a parent over a child or a teacher over a student. 
Also, a citizen has minor means of rejecting others’ life modes. She 
has the power of persuasion and can try to change others’ beliefs 
(e.g., Christian missionaries trying to convince atheist pedestrians 
to abandon their godless beliefs). In addition, “public opinion” 
could influence what is tolerated or rejected between citizens 
(Jones, 2010, pp. 44– 45). Groups of citizens may ostracize indi-
viduals whose life mode they reject (a Hindu student in India 
might invite all her Hindu classmates to her birthday party but not 
the only two M Normally, we accept what we agree with and reject 
what we disagree with uslim classmates). No political system can 
completely control how citizens associate with each other, and 
more important, a primary purpose of a liberal democracy is to 
provide citizens with the freedom to (not) associate with whoever 
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they want in private. However, the power to reject through social 
exclusion in public is limited by antidiscrimination laws. For 
example, in 2012, the owner of Masterpiece Cakeshop (a “public 
accommodation”) in Colorado tried to “reject” the practice of same 
sex marriage by refusing to bake a wedding cake for a gay couple, 
citing his religious beliefs, but the Colorado Civil Rights Commis-
sion determined that this refusal had been discriminatory and 
therefore illegal (ACLU, 2012). Similarly, the state enforces 
nondiscriminatory recruitment policies: even religious schools  
are generally not allowed to select students based on their (non)
religious identities.
The main point here is that, because respect is the primary 
means to enabling peaceful coexistence among citizens and these 
citizens have little power to reject practices, toleration plays only  
a minor role in the horizontal relation among them.
Defining the Limits of Toleration  
through Democratic Politics
Even though citizens have little need for toleration among them-
selves, they must maintain common limits of toleration; otherwise, 
they risk two scenarios.
The first is an anarchical system in which each citizen defines 
her own limits of toleration, which are not reciprocal, and there-
fore, toleration soon fails. For example, many Europeans expect 
others to tolerate Christian symbols, such as the crucifixes in 
Italian state schools that the European Court of Human Rights in 
2011 ruled did not violate the right to freedom of conscience of 
non- Christians (Guiraudon, 2011). However, they are often 
intolerant of Islamic symbols, as illustrated by Ebrahimian v. 
France, in which the same court judged in 2016 that it was lawful to 
not renew the contract of a Muslim hospital employee for refusing 
to remove her veil (Yarrow, 2016). This asymmetrical toleration is 
arguably making Muslims decreasingly tolerant of non- Muslim 
symbols, and so a downward spiral of intoleration emerges, in 
which citizens no longer tolerate other life modes and merely try to 
promote their own.
The second is a situation of moral relativism in which even 
harmful practices are tolerated. A citizen might judge that she 
cannot legitimately evaluate other life modes from within her 
belief or that the best strategy for perpetuating her life mode is to 
refrain from criticizing others— to live and let live. For example, 
following permission granted to Muslims to adjudicate certain 
cases relating to marriage or divorce in Sharia courts in Britain and 
Greece, German politicians raised the possibility of allowing 
Muslims in Germany to settle family cases in Sharia rather than 
state courts (Spiegel Online, 2012). However, given that women 
generally have lower status in Sharia courts, citizens protested that 
German Muslim women might suffer harm resulting from the 
infringement of their liberal individual rights in this situation of 
moral relativism.
The idea of shared limits suggests that people must agree on 
what constitutes reasonable disagreement. Therefore, these limits 
are reciprocal. Citizens might agree to allow all religious symbols 
in schools like in Britain or ban religious symbols in schools 
altogether like in France. To make toleration work and avoid 
intolerance or moral relativism, citizens must reciprocally honor 
these limits. Yet how are the limits determined if not through 
horizontal interactions? Scholars rarely answer this question. They 
discuss the boundaries of toleration, but few specify how these are 
drawn. The best descriptions are found in the justification 
approach and evaluation approach.
The justification approach is represented by Forst. Here, the 
limits of toleration depend on the principle of public justification. 
The approach distinguishes between the “permission conception,” 
in which the majority defines the limits of toleration arbitrarily 
and, therefore, they are unjust, and the “respect conception,” in 
which citizens create mutually acceptable limits by reciprocally 
refraining from shaping these limits according to their life modes. 
The reciprocity of the latter model provides the political justice on 
which toleration is based (Forst, 2004, pp. 314– 318).
The evaluation approach is advocated by Parekh. Its account 
of how the limits of toleration are defined is more realistic in that it 
assumes that power relations in society are unequal. Society should 
decide which practices to tolerate based on its “operative public 
values.” These values are defined in the constitution, laws, and 
“civic relations” between people. They evolved historically and 
continue to change through public dialogue. Unlike the public 
justification principle, the operative public values “articulate a 
specific conception of the good life” (Parekh, 1999, pp. 168– 175). 
The evaluation approach implies that toleration is still predomi-
nantly a vertical relation of power in which an authority extends 
toleration to the practices of subordinates. However, even though 
the approach indicates that the operative public values are partly 
defined in constitutional and regular laws, it does not indicate how 
these laws emerged.
I have critiqued these approaches elsewhere, arguing that they 
respectively understate and overstate the influence of citizens’ life 
modes in determining the limits of toleration; that the idea of 
toleration as restraint of power is too limited in the justification 
approach; and that both approaches remain too abstract (Van 
Waarden, 2012). Yet most important is that neither the justification 
nor the evaluation approach demonstrates how the limits of 
toleration are primarily defined in liberal democracy— through 
democratic legislation. Namely, in contrast to what scholars 
contend about the transition from vertical to horizontal toleration, 
there is still an important vertical relation of toleration between the 
democratic state and its citizens. The state continuously (re)defines 
the limits of toleration and has the power to sanction transgressors. 
It (re)defines these limits through its laws, which are reciprocally 
just in that they must be respected by all citizens equally. As a 
democracy represents its citizens, citizens play a role in determin-
ing the extent of its toleration. But how exactly do democracies 
define the limits of toleration, and which knowledge and skills do 
citizens require for their involvement?
In liberal democracies, representatives largely determine the 
limits of toleration through laws on behalf of citizens. These laws 
indicate which practices the democracy tolerates and which it 
rejects through prohibition. This prohibition is enforced through 
prosecution, penalties, and imprisonment. The limits of toleration 
do not always correspond with what representatives deem 
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rejectable: sometimes intolerable practices are legally tolerated for 
moral or pragmatic reasons (see Forst, 2004, pp. 321– 322; Jones, 
2010,  
p. 40; and Heyd, 1996, pp. 3– 4). Laws only indicate the outer 
boundary of toleration between the zones of tolerable and reject-
able practices, not the inner boundary between tolerable and 
unobjectionable practices. Citizens can thus choose to approve or 
disapprove of particular practices— but the laws indicate which 
practices are rejected. The legal limits of toleration are defined in 
three situations:
 • In the first situation, representatives indicate directly that 
the state rejects practices that most citizens deem intoler-
able. Representatives might want to reject female circumci-
sion and, therefore, create a law against it,5 which means 
that the practice is no longer tolerated. Some will judge 
such practices to violate the harm principle (so long as a 
person does not harm anyone, she should be free to think 
or do as she wishes, Mill, 2002, pp. 11– 13; also Parekh, 
1999, p. 165; Raz, 1988, pp. 155– 170). Therefore, they might 
argue that these practices should not even be up for debate, 
but constitute violations of constitutional rights.
 • In the second situation, a shift in the limits of toleration 
results from a reinterpretation of these constitutional 
rights. Constitutions are important in defining toleration, 
as they provide citizens with rights that no cultural prac-
tices may infringe. For example, parents generally may 
not invoke religious reasons to prevent their child from 
receiving education or life- saving medication, because it 
would violate the child’s individual rights. More generally, 
the basic rights of life and freedom of conscience prevent 
practices such as honor killings and forceful religious 
conversion. Constitutional rights place a basic limit on the 
toleration of cultural practices. However, these rights are 
generic formulations that must be interpreted. For example, 
a debate about constitutional rights to freedom of speech 
and conscience emerged when an imam in the Netherlands 
called homosexuality a disease at a Friday worship. Citi-
zens and politicians argued that the imam was violating 
the principle of nondiscrimination. Others replied that the 
imam expressed his belief, which is protected through the 
freedoms of conscience and speech. However, in express-
ing his belief, he arguably incited others to engage in the 
practice of discriminating against homosexuals. The result 
was a public discussion about the extent of the freedoms of 
speech and religion and antidiscrimination laws— and thus 
the extent of toleration (NRC, 2004). Such debates can lead 
to protests, petitions, and the election of parties that tighten 
or loosen the application of constitutional rights.
 • In the third situation, the limits of toleration are affected 
5 For example, Law No. 74 of 15 December 1995 Prohibiting Female 
Genital Mutilation in Norway; Law No. 316 of 27 May 1982 Prohibiting 
Female Circumcision in Sweden; and the Prohibition of Female Circum-
cision Act of 16 July 1985 in the United Kingdom.
indirectly through “neutral” laws that seek to regulate un-
controversial issues. The Dutch state, for example, intended 
to reduce animal cruelty by prohibiting certain slaughter 
methods. However, this regulation would have impeded the 
practices of Muslims and Jews, who require their animals to 
be slaughtered traditionally, and therefore they successfully 
protested against the law (Soeters, 2011). A second example 
is Wisconsin, which mandated that children must attend 
school until age sixteen. The law meant to ensure that all 
citizens achieve a basic education, but Amish parents chal-
lenged it successfully, claiming that schooling beyond grade 
eight would hinder their practice of instilling their life 
mode in their children (see also Galston, 1995; Gutmann, 
1995, pp. 565– 576). However, the appeal for religious ex-
emption is not always successful: in 2006, the Danish High 
Court ruled that Sikhs would not be exempted from the law 
against carrying knives in public to wear their ceremonial 
kirpan dagger (though countries such as England, Scot-
land, and Canada have granted this exemption to carry the 
kirpan in public, including in schools).
What role do citizens play in (re)defining these different types 
of laws that determine society’s limits of toleration? Perhaps most 
important, citizens elect representatives and hold them account-
able. In some places (e.g., 23 U.S. states), citizens also elect judges. 
Moreover, citizens influence political decisions through contacting 
their representatives, protesting, writing petitions, writing opinion 
pieces, and organizing advocacy groups. Once the limits of 
toleration have been determined, citizens can challenge these 
limits by taking cases to court. Occasionally citizens have the 
opportunity to express their views directly through referenda. For 
example, in 2009, Swiss citizens voted in favor of prohibiting the 
construction of minarets on mosques, thereby decreasing the 
state’s toleration of Muslim practices (BBC News, 2009). Certain 
states have proposition systems that allow citizens themselves to 
introduce laws for a direct vote: citizens of California voted to ban 
same- sex marriage in Proposition 22 in 2000 and Proposition 8 in 
2008, thereby also decreasing the state’s toleration of a minority 
practice.6 Finally, digital media such as blogs and wikis provide 
ways through which citizens advocate political views (see Kahne, 
Lee, & Feezell, 2012, pp. 3– 4). Thus, citizens play a limited but 
important role in shaping the limits of toleration. But do they 
require particular knowledge for their participation?
To represent themselves politically, citizens require knowl-
edge of the political process and its “access points.” They must be 
able to vote, contact an official, and find a lawyer. More generally, 
they should know how to volunteer, donate to campaigns, become 
member of a party, contact a lobbyist, start a petition or proposi-
tion, engage in advocacy work, organize protests, and use the 
(digital and social) media. Important here is that politics is 
generally not an altruistic deliberation guided by “public reason,” 
6 The author thanks one of the anonymous reviewers for bringing to 
his attention the proposition systems that exist in certain states, which 
also affect the democratic limits of toleration.
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as seems to be promoted by several theorists (e.g., Reich, 2002, p. 
126)— in which citizens put aside their narrow interests to discuss 
the common good— but rather a process of negotiating, bargain-
ing, and compromising among groups with conflicting interests. 
Consequently, participatory skills are no luxury, but essential to 
the survival of a citizen’s life mode and, indirectly, liberal democ-
racy itself. Citizens need “defensive” participatory skills when they 
constitute the minority on an issue and must defend their life mode 
against majority intoleration. This might include the skills to build 
a coalition, such as the cooperation among the Protestant, Angli-
can, and Orthodox Churches in the Church and Society Commis-
sion that lobbies EU policymakers (De Vlieger, 2012); or to defend 
religious rights judicially, like Leyla Şahin, who in 1998 took the 
Turkish state to court for having refused her the right to wear the 
Islamic headscarf at Istanbul University (ECHR, 2005). Con-
versely, citizens require “preventive” participatory skills when they 
form the majority but need to prevent intoleration of minority 
practices. For example, they should know how to join a majority 
party like the Dutch liberal party VVD to help reduce its anti- 
immigrant rhetoric and “tolerate” settling more refugees in the 
Netherlands. “Preventive” participation is no less essential than the 
“defensive”: diversity can only be maintained when citizens know 
how to defend their minority practices and prevent the rejection of 
others’ practices if they are tolerable.
In terms of knowledge required to form opinions on which 
practices the state should tolerate, it might be argued that each 
citizen could just endorse her life mode’s position. However, many 
citizens do not have coherent life modes and hold conflicting 
beliefs. In addition, life modes do not prescribe positions on all 
issues: atheists might oppose Protestant demands for schools to 
teach creationism and abstinence over evolution and sex education 
but might not have an opinion on whether Muslim students should 
be allowed to pray during class time and the Islamic past should be 
included in the national history curriculum. Subsequently, one 
might contend that, since laws are about practices, citizens require 
no knowledge about others’ beliefs: the state must allow harmless 
practices and prohibit harmful ones— regardless of the religious 
meaning. Indeed, murder should be prohibited, regardless of the 
murderer’s beliefs. However, the meaning of harm is controversial. 
In determining whether a practice is harmful, it helps to consider 
its motivation. The Muslim demand that girls wear headscarves in 
schools may seem oppressive, but some argue that within the girls’ 
culture it is liberating (e.g., Moghadam, 1994). It is meaningful to 
the girls and improves their equality vis- à- vis boys, as they are no 
longer judged by appearance. Also, for Rastafarians and certain 
Native Americans, the use of drugs is a “requirement of their way 
of life,” unlike for “white adolescents” for whom it is “a self- chosen 
action” (Parekh, 1999, p. 163). These arguments may not persuade 
others, but the knowledge that practices are obligatory within a 
different life mode may change citizens’ opinions on the limits of 
toleration. Finally, it may seem that citizens need no prior knowl-
edge of other life modes, because once these are threatened, their 
adherents will promote their practices via the media in an effort to 
save them.
Given these considerations, I argue that citizens need a 
minimal knowledge of other life modes and a solid understanding 
of how the media work. Citizens obtain information they need for 
decisions about toleration largely through the media, but they need 
a framework of reference about cultures and religions in which to 
interpret this information. Citizens need not have a thorough 
knowledge of all worldviews— which would be impossible— but to 
understand demands to wear hijabs or kippahs in workplaces or 
slaughter animals ritualistically, it would help if they had a basic 
knowledge of Islam and Judaism. In addition, an understanding of 
how the media function can help citizens assess media information 
critically. For example, understanding how the media depend on 
sensationalism would help citizens to relativize (false) claims like 
“American schools are becoming Islamized.”
The critical thinking required to evaluate cultural practices 
and their media coverage does not correspond to the “autonomy” 
that many liberals advocate. Though autonomy is usually associ-
ated with comprehensive liberalism, Reich (2002) has argued that 
even political liberalism relies on “minimalist autonomy”: “under-
lying [the] political virtues is the notion that citizens are autono-
mous” (pp. 41– 42, 46).7 He acknowledged that autonomy “is not 
supported by all reasonable ways of life” (p. 46). Galston prioritized 
accommodating this reasonable diversity over autonomy and 
claimed that citizens always have a “right of exit” from their 
cultural group, but Reich has objected that such a right of exit is 
only meaningful if citizens are proactively taught to scrutinize their 
life modes and consider alternatives autonomously (pp. 53– 54). 
However, Reich has treated liberal democracy too much as a 
“supermarket” in which life mode “options” should be made 
available to citizens and from which they should be actively 
encouraged to choose: “the conception of autonomy I defend refers 
to a person’s ability to reflect independently and critically upon 
basic commitments, values, desires, and beliefs, be they chosen or 
unchosen, and to enjoy a range of meaningful life options from 
which to choose” (p. 105, also pp. 1– 14, 46, 101, 106; Nussbaum, 
1994, p. 4). Thus, Reich’s “minimalist autonomy” is not that 
minimalist. Reich is correct that citizens need to learn minimal 
critical thinking and have a basic understanding of other world-
views for liberal democracy to function, but his assumption that 
political virtues depend on autonomy is incorrect.
My analysis of toleration shows that the demands of liberal 
democracy are more basic. Citizens need not reflect critically on 
their own life modes, let alone be encouraged to choose among 
different life modes in society. To enable the coexistence of cultural 
groups in a liberal democracy, citizens need not be independent 
(autonomous) from any religious or cultural commitments. 
Rather, from within their particular life modes, they should be able 
to engage in the democratic process to defend their practices and to 
evaluate critically whether the practices of other groups should be 
legally tolerated. The limited extent of the demands that toleration 
7 For an explanation of the argument that there is a slippery slope 
between political and comprehensive liberalism, see also Gutmann, 1995, 
p. 573; Kymlicka, 1995, pp. 107– 130, 152– 172; 2002, pp. 208– 283; 
Vaughan, 2005, p. 404.
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places on citizens— that it does not force people to critically assess 
their own way of life— also means that there is no conflict between 
a person’s private beliefs and the critical thinking that she is 
expected to engage in publicly as a citizen.8 Finally, Reich (2002) 
has overestimated the demands of a meaningful right of exit. He 
wondered how “it [would] ‘seem desirable’ to assess alternatives” 
unless one is autonomous, and argued that “portals of exit are in 
effect sealed shut when there are no windows to the outside world” 
(p. 54). However, history has shown that when people are unhappy 
with their religious, political, or economic situations, they tend to 
at least look for alternatives. Many African and Middle Eastern 
refugees in Europe did not receive an education for autonomy, but 
once their life situations became undesirable, they sought alterna-
tives. If people in developing countries manage to inform them-
selves about alternative life modes in another continent, then 
surely citizens of modern mediatized liberal democracies with 
more advanced economic and technological means must generally 
be able to find alternatives within their own society when neces-
sary. Overall, autonomy requires citizens to actively consider other 
life modes as alternatives to their own, whereas toleration requires 
citizens to understand that these life modes matter to fellow citizens 
and therefore perhaps deserve to be tolerated.
The Educational Requirements of Toleration
Toleration thus requires more than the minimalist political liberal 
education but less than the activist education. The minimalist 
position is correct that a liberal democracy that seeks to accommo-
date diversity can only mandate schools to teach toleration and 
does not require students to scrutinize their own life mode. Yet 
toleration requires more engagement with different life modes and 
critical deliberation than Galston has acknowledged. However, the 
activist position is too demanding, because toleration does not 
require a broad institutional effort to foster appreciation and 
cooperation between citizens, nor a transformation of their values. 
If liberal democracy intends to accommodate its diversity of 
(conflicting) life modes through toleration, it cannot expect 
students to develop a positive recognition of beliefs that conflict 
with their own, or to transform their beliefs so that they will agree 
more with others. The education required for toleration approxi-
mates Rawls’s moderate position: that citizens must learn about the 
liberal democratic process and be exposed to different life modes. 
This exposure to life modes that the moderate position advocates  
is primarily based on the idea that citizens must cooperate and 
reciprocate horizontally. By contrast, an education for toleration 
includes this minimal exposure to enable citizens to make judg-
ments about vertical toleration between the state and its citizens. 
Rawls, like many theorists, did not really address the implications 
of his theory, but what are the consequences of the moderate 
position for schooling?
Research has shown that democratic education can indeed 
increase civic participation (Gibson & Levine, 2003; Hess & 
8 For the argument that minimal exposure to other life modes and 
minimal critical thinking skills need not lead to a critical stance towards 
one’s own life mode, see also Appiah, 2003, p. 72; Heyd, 1996, p. 15.
McAvoy, 2015, pp. 57, 68, 145; Kahne, Chi, & Middaugh, 2006,  
pp. 396, 400; on toleration, Avery, Bird, Johnstone, Sullivan, & 
Thalhammer, 1992; Wood et al., 1994), but that there “has been a 
striking lack of consensus about what democracy requires of 
citizens and of schools” (Westheimer & Kahne, 2003, pp. 9– 10). 
Democratic education has different outcomes depending on its 
objectives, and therefore, it is important to clarify those objectives 
(Kahne, Chi, & Middaugh, 2006, p. 404). Toleration leads to five 
objectives: students must learn (1) to respect each other as fellow 
citizens in public; (2) the constitutional rights that protect citizens’ 
life modes; (3) how to participate in the democratic political 
process; (4) the basic characteristics of other life modes; and  
(5) how to obtain and interpret information from the media.
These objectives can be reached through public, as well as 
private and religious, schools. Toleration does not demand 
teaching liberal autonomy (including the critical reflection on one’s 
life mode that might be difficult in a religious school) and liberal 
democracy attempts to enable the perpetuation of reasonable life 
modes. Even if “mixed” schooling would be ideal for learning to 
tolerate difference (Brighouse, 2006, p. 21; Marx & Byrnes, 2012), 
then over time there might be little left to tolerate if cultural groups 
would not be able to instill their life modes in their children 
through their schools. Thus, toleration is compatible with, and 
arguably supports, the practice of most liberal democracies— e.g., 
Austria, Belgium, and Ireland, but increasingly even France and 
the United States— of publicly funding religious schools (Maussen 
& Bader, 2015, pp. 8– 9). These religious schools should be allowed 
to instill their worldviews in their students, in contrast to the 
argument of Reich (2002), who endorsed religious schools but 
indicated that regulations should “urge not the teaching of religion 
but teaching about religion [Reich’s emphases]” (p. 198), and 
prescribed that “charter schools not distinguish themselves on the 
basis of ethnoracial, religious, or other cultural divisions in 
society” (p. 209). Given that Hess and McAvoy found that students 
educated in a “like- minded school” were more politically engaged 
(2015, p. 146; see also Jamieson & Cappella, 2008; Mutz, 2006), 
religious schools might even stimulate participation in democratic 
deliberation about toleration in later life.
Within the curriculum, three subjects are particularly 
important for teaching toleration: a government class, a cultural 
and religious perspectives class, and a media course. The govern-
ment class seems best placed to teach the first three objectives. 
First, students must learn to respect each other as fellow citizens in 
their public interactions, which supports Hess and McAvoy’s aim 
of teaching “political equality” (2015, pp. 5, 156). Students must be 
shown the reason: that common life only functions peacefully if 
citizens put aside their differences when interacting in public. 
Simultaneously, students should learn that not all cultural practices 
are tolerable but that they should deliberate democratically about 
what their society should accept or prohibit, rather than acting 
individually against others. The line between public and private is 
not always clear, but given the importance of this normative 
distinction for the maintenance of liberal democratic diversity, 
schools should encourage students to separate public and private 
behavior (which supports Dewey’s idea that education should be 
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“purifying and idealizing the existing social customs,” 1916/2007, p. 
22).
Second, schools should teach students liberal democracy’s 
constitutional rights, which limit the scope of decisions of tolera-
tion. Students should understand that their beliefs, and some of 
their practices, are protected and must be tolerated by the state, 
and that conversely there are other beliefs and practices that they 
cannot legislate against. For example, American students should 
know that they can use their rights to religion, speech, and 
assembly to protect their life modes, and German students that 
they can appeal to their constitution to prohibit intolerant political 
parties (see Schmitt, 2000). In democracies with judicial review, 
students should learn about examples of citizens challenging 
“intolerant” laws in court, such as the advocates of same- sex 
marriage in the United States in 2015 (Liptak, 2015). This knowl-
edge will clarify to students the power that the state has and will 
prevent them from unnecessarily fearing intervention in their  
life modes.
Third, the government class should teach democratic 
participation. Students should learn how to vote, contact officials, 
volunteer, access advocacy groups, start a petition, and organize a 
protest. Again, it is essential that they understand the reason: they 
need these skills to represent and defend their life modes and to 
contribute to maintaining a state that tolerates reasonable 
practices. Students could learn about examples that illustrate the 
importance of democratic participation for defining toleration. 
For example, in France they might study S.A.S. v. France, a 2011 
case in which a Muslim had objected that a new law prohibiting 
facial concealment in public conflicted with her religious duties, 
and in which the ECHR ruled that the French state’s aims of 
pursuing “public safety” and the “protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others” justified the law. This case is interesting for 
students, as the court stated that it exercised restraint in its review 
because society had the freedom to decide on such issues and the 
law had been arrived at through the democratic process, while the 
court also warned the state that creating such a law risked further 
stereotyping between life modes and increasing social conflict 
(ECHR, 2014). The case shows students that they, as democratic 
citizens of the society, have influence on the toleration limits but 
also that they need to consider how laws affect life modes and their 
interactions. Furthermore, students should learn that even though 
their life modes might constitute a minority or majority, they 
share identity characteristics related to, for example, gender, age, 
and occupation that make them part of different minorities or 
majorities (Van Waarden, 2014), which places different demands 
on them in terms of forging coalitions or exercising restraint of 
majority power. Students need to be shown that their contribu-
tions make a difference, so they will be more inclined to partici-
pate (see Kahne, Chi, & Middaugh, 2006, p. 397; Levinson, 2013,  
p. 10). Political participation among young citizens is low and  
not a focus within civic education (Westheimer & Kahne, 2003,  
pp. 9– 10), but my analysis of toleration shows that teaching 
participation should be a priority.
The class on cultural and religious perspectives could address 
the fourth objective: to provide students with a basic 
understanding of other worldviews. The literature contains 
theoretical (see Dewey, 1916/2007, p. 22) and empirical arguments 
(see Brundidge & Rice, 2009) about the value of exposure to 
diversity for democracy and toleration. However, toleration does 
not require teachers to “cultivate a cosmopolitan outlook” (Reich, 
2002, p. 184) nor  
an appreciation for other life modes (let alone present them as 
alternative truths or choices for students). Rather, students should 
be made aware that there are ways of life different from their own, 
which matter to other people and do not cause harm and therefore 
deserve to be tolerated by the state. This minimal understanding 
should provide students with a framework in which they can 
interpret new information about others’ practices and based on 
which they can make evaluations of toleration.
The media studies class would train students to become 
critical (digital) media consumers, meeting the fifth objective. 
Discussions of media training are less common in civic education 
writing, but most information that students need in their lives to 
participate democratically and evaluate social practices they will 
receive through the media. In addition, political polarization is 
exacerbated by the increasing segregation of media sources and 
communities (Schkade, Sunstein, & Hastie, 2007; Sunstein, 2001). 
Students need to learn about these sources and their differences 
and how to filter and assess media information. As research has 
shown that, in contrast to the common perception, students lack 
critical media skills (Hargittai, 2010), such skills should be 
included in the curriculum (see Buckingham, 2003; Jenkins, 2006; 
Stoddard, 2014). A tool for the development of such a curriculum 
is, for example, Project Look Sharp (www.projectlooksharp.org). 
Whereas digital media literacy education is found to encourage 
students to participate politically online (Kahne, Lee, & Feezell, 
2012), (digital) media literacy is essential for online and offline 
participation (though research shows that online also stimulates 
offline participation, see Mossberger, Tolbert, & McNeal, 2008; 
Shah, McLeod, & Lee, 2009).
In teaching these objectives, there is a distinction between 
core knowledge and interactions with others. Core knowledge 
seems straightforward: the government class should teach how 
liberal democracy functions; how legislation is proposed, debated, 
and passed; what the participatory access points are, how laws are 
reviewed and overturned by courts, and how laws determine what 
is tolerated in society. The cultural and religious perspectives class 
should provide a survey of major religions, like Christianity, Islam, 
and Hinduism, but also atheism and agnosticism, and the reasons 
for their views on issues like abortion, euthanasia, and same- sex 
marriage. The media studies class should focus on institutional 
structures and incentives of media organizations, ideological 
differences between news outlets, and how selection and framing 
of news affects its reception.
Building on this core knowledge, the teaching would empha-
size interactional learning. The main skill that toleration demands 
of citizens is democratic deliberation, and the best way to teach this 
seems to let students deliberate in a democratic manner. This idea 
is supported by research that shows that the most effective civics 
teaching occurs through classes that are discussion- based, not 
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between teacher and students but among students, so that each 
student gains experience in expressing herself politically and 
dealing with other perspectives (see Hess, 2002, pp. 11, 36– 37; Hess 
& McAvoy, 2015, pp. 52– 57). The government class should include 
simulations in which students represent their views in moot 
parliaments and courts (see Avery, 2001; on the proven effective-
ness but rare implementation of such simulations, see Kahne, 
Rodriguez, Smith, & Thiede, 2000; Kahne & Westheimer, 2003; 
Kahne, Chi, & Middaugh, 2006, p. 402– 403) and debate how laws 
or verdicts would modify the state’s toleration of the religious 
practices of its citizens. Students could use examples from the news 
that might apply to their school environment. For example, 
following the effort of the Dutch liberal parties D66 and VVD to 
remove the official (Christian) Sunday resting day (NRC, 2016b) 
and the request from primary school students in Amsterdam to 
make Sugar Festival an official school holiday (NRC, 2016a), 
students could discuss whether the school should create flexible 
timetables that would enable students to take off days that carry 
meaning within their life modes. It is acceptable and even benefi-
cial if students represent personal worldviews in simulations: it 
makes simulations less threatening by avoiding the need for 
students to take stands against their life modes and prepares them 
for reality in which they will also have to represent their life modes 
democratically. In addition, research suggests that an appeal to 
students’ interests makes simulations more relevant, which in turn 
improves their participation outcomes (see Kahne, Chi, & Mid-
daugh, 2006, p. 402).
As many schools have a homogenous student population, 
classes should be encouraged to participate in (inter)national 
simulations, such as the Model European Parliament or Capitol 
Forum, in which students encounter peers with other life modes 
with whom to debate questions of toleration. In addition, like- 
minded schools can focus on the nuances of opinions within, for 
example, Christianity or Islam (see Hess & McAvoy, 2015, p. 115). 
Like- minded schools should also seek other ways for students to 
experience diversity. The cultural and religious perspectives class 
could use literature (Hess & McAvoy, 2015, p. 144; Nussbaum, 1998, 
p. 111); films (Hess & McAvoy, 2015, p. 115); or photographs (Lint-
ner, 2005) as ways to show students other perspectives and 
highlight other worldviews in historically or geographically 
removed contexts (see Avery, 2001; Dewey, 1916/2007, p. 163). 
Invited guest speakers from other religions could present their 
perspective on controversies like abortion (see Finlay, 2007, p. 488; 
Hess & McAvoy, 2015, p. 117). The internet increasingly offers 
opportunities like civic games for students to engage with other 
viewpoints and their adherents. Unlike other forms of civic 
participation, such online opportunities are more equally available 
to all students (see Afsari- Mamagani, 2014; Kahne, Lee, & Feezell, 
2012; Kahne, Middaugh, & Evans, 2008; Lenhart et al., 2008).
Finally, teaching for toleration supports the idea of an open 
classroom environment in which students feel free to express their 
views (Hahn, 1998; Torney- Purta, Lehmann, Oswald, & Schultz, 
2001), and supports a school culture, or “hidden curriculum,” that 
fosters skills necessary for democratic deliberation about questions 
of common interest (Çubukcu, 2012; De Groof, Elchardus, Franck, 
& Kavadias, 2010, p. 24; Dewey, 1916/2007, pp. 34– 35, 155, 252, 
262– 263; Levinson, 2013, p. 12; Meier, 2003). School is the perfect 
place to teach mutual public respect, as school is an example of an 
institution that enforces public equality. School uniforms could 
help to accentuate this equality, as they signal to students that, 
regardless of their life modes, once they enter the schoolhouse, 
they are all equal fellow students. A student government (see 
Theisen, 2002), newspaper, and court (which three Amsterdam 
high schools are experimenting with, Volkskrant, 2016) could 
promote political participation. Students should be given the 
responsibility to discuss rules that determine how the school 
functions and which behaviors should be (dis)allowed— what they 
democratically decide is tolerable and intolerable in the school 
society.
Whereas practices of civic education are mixed, with, for 
example, digital media training being widespread (Kahne, Lee, & 
Feezell, 2012, pp. 11, 13) but political discussions being rare (Kahne, 
Rodriguez, Smith, & Thiede, 2000; Nystrand, Wu, Gamoran, 
Zeiser, & Long, 2003), my analysis of toleration has strengthened 
the argument that liberal democracy requires more rigorous civic 
education (e.g., Westheimer & Kahne, 2003, p. 12). The challenge 
for empirical research will be to understand how educators can 
balance teaching a way of life with engaging students minimally 
with other worldviews. The study of Hess and McAvoy (2015,  
pp. 133– 144) of a teacher who taught minimal critical thinking and 
diversity from within the Christian worldview provides an 
example for such research.
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